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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PAUL MANSELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 9891

WARD.EN JOHN W. TURNER,
Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPrONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The instant appeal is from a denial of appellant's petition for habeas corpus seeking his release
from the Utah State Prison after being recommitted
by the Board of Pardons when the appellant failed
to comply with the terms of his conditional release.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On ~October 16, 1962, the appellant filed his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County. On January 4, 1963, a return on the writ was filed, and
on January 16, 1963, a hearing was held before
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on the appellant's
1
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petition. On February 5, 1963, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law based
on the hearing, and further entered its order denying the appellant's petition for habeas corpus. On
February 26, 1963, appellant filed notice of appeal
from the trial court's decision
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement
of facts in supplement to those set out in the appellant's brief.
The appellant is presently confined in the Utah
State Prison for the crime of second degree burglary. On August 21, 1962, the appellant was granted a conditional termination from his sentence, and
released from the Utah State Prison by the State
Board of Pardons upon condition that the appellant "immediately depart from the State of Utah."
The termination order further provided "that if
he should ever again enter the State of Utah for
any purpos·e whatsoever, then this Order of Conditional Termination becomes null and void and
the said Paul Mansell will be subject to arrest and
reimprisonment in the Utah State Prison, to serve
the remainder of his sentence." (T. 7). At the hearing before the Utah State Board of Pardons, prior
to appellant'~s release, appellant requested super2
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vised parole; however, the Board of Pardons rejected the appellant's request and afforded him an
opportunity to accept a conditional termination
upon the above mentioned condition. (T. 16, 17).
Appellant accepted the termination and signed the
order of termination, which provided:
"I, Paul Mansell, Hereby certify that I
have read and understand the above Order
of Conditional Termination and the legal import thereof has been explained to m·e. I agree
to abide by this conditional termination and
do so of my own free will."
The trial court found that the appellant accepted the conditional termination "voluntarily
and without any coercion or duress other than tlie
fact that if he failed to accept the conditional release, he was to remain in custody of the Warden
of the Utah State Prison for an additional period
of time." (T. 17).
Mter being released, the appellant failed to
leave the State of Utah. The trial court found that
appellant had no intention of leaving the State
although he had adequate means and opportunity
to leave. (T. 17). Subsequent to his release, information was communicated to the Board of Pardons that appellant was consorting with ex-convicts
and was in some other difficulties. (T. 17).
The appellant was arrested on August 30, 1962
by the Board of Pardons and remanded to the custody of the Warden of the Utah State Prison to
3
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serve an additional year on his sentence of second
degree burglary. The arrest was on the basis that
appellant had violated the terms of his conditional
release by failing to leave Utah and having no intention of lea:ving. (T. 17).
The trial court further found that the petitioner was a resident of Missi'ssippi and that there
was not a parole compact nor prisoner transfer
agreement between Utah and Mississippi. (T. 17).
The appellant had been previously convicted of a
felony in Kentucky, and had been in difficulty in
Wyoming and also while in the Armed Forces; but
appellant had no difficulty while residing in Mississippi with his family. (T. 18).
The trial court ruled that the Board of Pardons'
conditional termination of appellant was a legal
and proper condition and exercise of the executive
pardon and parole power, and that the appellant's
recommitment for violation of the terms of his conditional relea;se was warranted. (T. 18). The court
also found that even if the ·Board of Pardons had
acted in excess of its powers, the whole order of
release was void and the appellant would still be
lawfully in the custody of the Warden until expiration of his sentence or releaJse. (T. 18).

4
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CONDITIONAL RELEASE OF APPELLANT BY
THE BOARD OF PARDONS FROM HIS TERM OF IMPRISONMENT UPON CONDITION THAT HE LEAVE UTAH
AND NEVER RETURN IS A VALID CONDITION, NOT VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OR THE UNITED STATES.

The Board of Pardons is a constitutionally established body with the power to exercise the pardon power that is exercised by the executive branch
of government. Article VII, Section 12, Utah Constitution, provides that the Board of Pardons may:
"* * * upon such conditions, and with such
limitations and restrictions as they deem
prop·er, may remit fines and forfeitures,
commute punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason and
impeachments, subject to such regulations as
may be provided by law, relative to the manner of applying for pardons; but no fine or
forfeiture shall be remitted, and no commutation or pardon granted, except after a full
hearing before the Board, in open session, after previous notice on the time and place of
such hearing has been given.* * *" (Emphasis added.)
The Legislature has implemented the constitutional
provision by statute. 77-6.2-3, U .C.A. 1953, provides:
"I shall be the duty of the board of pardons to determine by majority decision, when
and under what conditions, subject to the provisions of this act, persons now or hereafter
serving sentences, in all cases except treason
or impeachments, in the penal or correctional
institutions of this state, may be released upon
5
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parole, pardoned, or 1nay have their fines or
forfeitures re1nitted, or their sentences comInuted or ter1ninated; * * *."
77-62-7, U.C.A. 1953, provides in its relevant part:
" * * * Said board is further empowered and
authorized to promulgate reasonable rules
and regulations, not inconsistent with law,
which shall establish the general conditions
under which parole shall be granted and revoked." (Emphasis added.)
77-62-15, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"When the board of pardons shall release
a prisoner on parole it shall specify in writing
the conditions of the pa:r~ole, and a certificate
of parole setting forth such conditions shall
be given to the parolee and shall be accepted
and agreed to by him as evidenced by his
signature affixed to a duplicate copy to be
retained in the files of said board."
In the instant case the appellant's release was
conditional. Whether a parole (unmentioned in
the Constitution) or commutation or pardon, the
Board of Pardons, by Article VII, Section 12, is
empowered to attach what conditions and limitations as they deem proper. Article VII, Section 12.
The conditional termination, parole, or pardon
all emanate from the power of the executive to
relieve a prisoner from the restraints imposed by
the sovereign. 39 Am. Jur., Pardon, Reprieve and
Amnesty, Sees. 2, 4, 5, 81 and 83. In Cardisco v.
Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64 P. 2d 216 (1937), this court
noted:
6
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"The power to parole prisoners is included within the power to 'remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishments, and grant
pardons.' "
In the Cardisco case, the court recognized that
the Board of Pardons has wide discretion to determine the conditions of imprisonment and pardon~
and that the limitations upon the Board are only
those limitations generally imposed by the constitutions of both the State, and where applicable,
the Federal Government. Historically, conditions
associated with the pardon power are limited only
in that they may not be "illegal, immoral or impossible of performance." In Re McKinney, 33 Del. 434,
436, 138 Atl. 649 (1927); Guy v. Utecht, 216 Minn.
255, 12 N.W.2d 753 (1943); 5 Utah L. Rev. 365,
370 (1957). This is merely another means of noting that the conditions of executive clemency may
not exceed proper limitations. A person on parole
is in the status of a prisoner. In McCoy v. Harris.,
108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945), this court noted:
"From the above provisions, it is clear
that a parole is in the nature of a grant
of partial liberty or a lessening of restrictions to a convicted prisoner. Granting of a
parole does not change the status of a prisoner; it merely 'pushes back the prison walls'
and allows him the wider freedom of movement while serving his sentence. The paroled
prisoner is legally in cu~tody the sam~ as
the prisoner allowed the hberty of the pnson
yard, or of 'Yorking on the prison farm. The
realm in which he serves has been extended.
7
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He is in the custody of the state and serving
his sentence outside of the prison rather than
within the walls. The parole system is reformatory and founded upon a plan and policy
of helping the inmate to gain strength and
resistance to temptation, to build up his self
control, to adjust his attitudes and actions to
social controls and standards; and it aims to
extend his liberties and opportunities for normal living within the social fabric as his
strength to meet new responsibilities grows
and develops."

***
In the case of a parolee, the judgment
is a sentence and commitment. The legal position conferred upon the party by such judgment is the obligation to serve the designated
term in prison. Until that sentence is terminated, the judgment committing him to the
custody of the prison authorities is still in
effect. The additional liberty conferred by the
parole is a result of action by the Board of
Pardons, an administrative body. The parolee
is still in custodia legis, and under the control
of the State Board, though outside prison
walls. * * *"
The same is equally true of a conditional termination which is merely a parole with limited condition. 5 Utah L. Rev. 365, 373 (1957); Ops. Utah
Att'y. Gen. 56-131 (1956). The question obviously
is whether this condition imposed on a prisoner by
executive authority is harmonious with the relevant constitutions. It is submitted that it is.
First, a distinction must be drawn between the
8
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use of a condition like that imposed in a sentence
as distinct from when such a condition is imposed
by a pardoning authority. Thus, in 5 Utah L. Rev.
365, 369 (1957), it is noted:
"The most extensive use of banishment in
this country has been by the executive branches of our state governments. This is frequently accomplished by granting a pardon on the
condition that the convict leave the state. The
courts which have considered the question are
just as unanimous in upholding this practice
as they are in denouncing the use of banishment in the form of a sentence. There has
been but one case in which such a condition
was held to be illegal and void, and it was
subsequently disapproved."
A similar conclusion was reached in an article
in 111 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 758, 765 (1963), where
the author comments:
"Judicial declarations invalidating banishment by courts do not purport to apply
to executive pardon. The modern pardon power has been held to be analogous to that of
the Kings of England and, therefore, almost
absolute. Public policy places no limitations
on the executive, who is usually not even
required to state the reasons for his actions
much less to justify the.m. Consequently, although banishment is uniformly condemned
when connected with a judicial sentence, it
is upheld with equal unanimity when attached
as a condition to executive pardon."
The general rule is noted also in 39 Am. J ur.,
Pardon, Reprieve, and Amnesty, Sec. 68:
9
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"Some statutes authorize the governor to
grant pardons on condition that the convicted
person shall leave the state and never again
return to it, but by the great weight of authority, even in the absence of any statute,
such condition is valid, as is a condition requiring the prisoner to leave the United
States and not return. * * *"
See also 60 ALR 1410, 1415.
The appellant has cited decisions from two
states holding such conditions, when imposed by
the judiciary as part of a sentence, illegal. However, the courts of both states have upheld such
conditions imposed incident to executive clemency.
In In Re Cammarata's Petition, 341 Mich. 528, 67
N.W.2d 677 (1954), Cert. Den. 349 U.S. 953, the
petitioner sought release from imprisonment on
the grounds that his recommitment to prison was
illegal. His imprisonment had been terminated by
the Michigan Commissioner of Pardons and Pan6les upon condition that he leave the United
States and never return. The petitioner did return
and was reimprisoned. The Michigan Supreme
Court held the petitioner's rearrest and commitment proper, and the condition valid. The court
first ruled the action of the Board of Pardons was
proper under a similar Michigan constitutional
provision2 to that of Utah's. 3 The court held that
1

Michigan v. Eva Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95; State "'·
Baker, 58 S.C. 111, 36 S.E. 501.
2
Art. VI, Sec. 9, Mich. Const.
3 Art. VII, Sec. 12, Utah Const.

1

10
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reasonable conditions could be set on pardons and
paroles. The court said:
"It is generally held that a condition that
the convict leave the state and never return
is a valid condition. (Citing authority).
It has also been held that a condition
requiring the prisoner to leave the United
States and not return is a valid condition.
(Citing authority).
In our opinion the condition attached to
petitioner's commutation of sentence was
valid."
The South Carolina courts have also so ruled.
State v. Fuller, 1 McCord, 178, 12 S.C. Law 178
(1821); State v. Smith, 1 Bailey 283, 17 S.C. Law
283 (1829); State v. Addington, 2 Bailey 516, 18
S.C. Law 516; State v. Barnes, 32 S.C. 14, 10 S.E.
611 (1890). These are not the only jurisdictions
that have considered the matter.
In P'eOple v. Potter, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 235 (N.Y.
1846), the defendant was convicted of grand larceny and thereafter pardoned upon condition that
he leave the United States and never return. He
was thereafter found in Louisiana and reimprisoned. The court considered that authority for such
a condition and noted substantial English precedent supporting similar conditions. The court commented:
"Banishment was first known in England
as abjuration, where the party accused fled
to a sanctuary, confessed his crime, and took
11
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an oath to leave the kingdom and not return
without permission. (4 Bl. Com. 333; 3 P.
Williams, 37.) This was not as a punishment,
but as :a condition of pa1·don. After abjuration was abolished, and about the reign of
Charles II., it becam·e usual to grant pardons
on condition of banishment, and that the original sentence should be revived on a violation
of the stipulations of its remission. (Kel. pre.
4; Williams, J. Felony, VI.; 1 Ch. Cr. 789.)
And it was usual to bind the criminal as an
apprentice, and both he and his master were
liable to severe penalties on his return. Afterward the performance of the stipulation of
banishment was enforced by requiring s·ecurity from him that he would leave the country,
and finally the practice settled down to that
adopted in this case, namely, that of granting
pardons on condition, and enforcing the condition by inflicting the original sentence upon
the party, in case of violation.
It seems then that the practice of granting conditional pardons is sustained by the
principles of the common law which we have
adopted as the law of the land; by the practice
of the country whose institution in this regard we have borrowed in totidem verbis; by
the provisions of the Constitutions of the
United States, and of most of the States of
the Union; by the decisions of the courts of
the United States, and of our own State, and
of other States in the Union; by the enactments of our statute for over half a century,
and by the practice of our executive since the
formation of our government.

***

I ought not to dismiss this part of the
12
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case without noticing an objection which was
pressed upon me with much ·earnestness to
wit, that, banishment being a punishment'unknown to our law, the imposition of it as a
condition of the pardon was in violation of
that provision of our bill of rights which forbids the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments. (1 R.S. 94, 17.)
There is no doubt that any immoral, impossible or illegal condition would be void.
This is a principle of the common law well
established (Com. Dig. Titl Condition, D;
Pease's case, 3 John. Ca. 333; Watson's case,
9 Ad. & Ell. 731.)
"And the general language of the statute,
that the governor may grant pardons 'upon
such conditions, and with such restrictions,
and under such limitations as he may think
proper,' is to be taken subject to this principle.
His conditions must· not be immoral, impossible or illegal. No authority to impose such
conditions has been or could be conferred
upon him by the statute. Therefore the argument of the prisoner's counsel, drawn fro.m
the general language of the statute, that it
was void because it authorized the governor
to impose unusual or cruel punishments, necessarily falls to the ground. These barbarous
practices are impliedly excluded from the
enactment unless it should actually express
them. (Pr Ld. D·enman. 9 A. & E. 783.)
No principle is better established than
this, that statutes must be so construed that
all their parts, when in pari materia, shall be
allowed to operate, and the effect of that
rule on these statutes is simply that the go'v13
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ernor may grant a pardon on a condition
which does not subject the prisoner to an unusual or cruel punishment. Banishment is
neither. It is sanctioned by authority, and has
been inflicted, in this form, from the foundation of our government. * * *"
Thus the court noted the power was exercised not
as punishment, but attendant to the executive authority- a conditional act of grace. United States
v. Wil$on, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 149, 160 (1833). In
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall) 14 (1800), the
United States Supreme Court passed upon a
Georgia treason statute. Justice Paterson, in upholding the statute, noted:
"But the power of confiscation and banishment does not belong to the judicial authority, whose process could not reach the
off·enders; and yet, it is a power that grows
out of the very nature of the social compact,
which 1nust reside somew·here, and which is
so inherent in the legislature, that it cannot
be divested or transferred, without an ex·
press provision of the constitution." (Emphasis added.)
Thus the Supreme Court, speaking shortly
after the adoption of the Constitution and the first
ten amendments, found nothing wrong with such
power as was exercised in the instant case, and
felt it so inherent as to require express rejection
before being deemed illegal. Thus, historically,
courts have felt that the use of such conditional
termination, as is present here, is proper. 111 Univ.
14
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Pa. L. Rev. 758, 768 (1963)/ Ex Parte Marks, 64
Cal. 29, 28 Pac. 109 (1883); Pippin v. Johnson, 192
Ga. 450, 15 S.E.2d 712 (1941); Ex Parte Lockhart,
12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 515 (1855); Commonwealth v.
Haggerty, 4 Brewster 326 (Pa. 1869); Flavell's Case
8 W & S 197 (Pa. 1844); State ex rei Davis v.
Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 100 N.W. 510 (1904); State
ex rei O''Connor v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 54 N.W.
1065 (1893).
In Ex Parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 33 S.W.
106 (1895), the accused sought discharge by habeas
corpus after being committed for violation of a
conditional pardon requiring that he leave Arkansas
and not return. The Arkansas Constitution prohibited exile. Even so, the Arkansas Supreme
Court held the condition properly within the power
of the executive. It noted:
" * ~ * When a citizen of another state or
country commits a crime in this state, it
might, under some circumstances, be to the
best interest of all concerned that a pardon
be granted on condition that he· leave the
state and never return. One can readily conceive of other instances when, to prevent the
possibility of future strife between the convicted person and those against whose persons or property he had committed a crime,
it would be proper to impose this as a condition of the pardon. We think the constitution
~"

* * * most courts have summarily dismissed the idea that
banishment might be cruel and unusual." 111 Univ. Pa. L.
Rev. 758, 777 (1963).

15
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does not deprive the governor of the power
to grant pardons on such conditions. * * *"
More recenty in 'Kavalin v. White, 44 F. 2d
49 (lOth Cir. 1930), the Federal Court affirmed a
similar conditional release, where the ·exclusion
was fron1 the United States. The court noted:
Petitioner further contends that the
condition annexed to such pardon was illegal
and that the pardon was absolute * * *. The
power to grant a pardon includes the lesser
power to grant a conditional pardon. The condition may be either precedent or subsequent
* * *· The condition imposed may be of any
nature, so long as it is not illegal, immoral
or impossible of performance * * *. The condition that the person pardoned shall depart
from and remain without the state is not
illegal."
The Tenth Circuit has most recently reaffirmed
this position. Vitale v. Hunter, .206 F.2d 826 (lOth
Cir. 1953). The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals in Ex Parte Sherman, 159 P.2d 755 (Okla.
1945) upheld a conditional termination of a prisoner's sentence where it required he leave Oklahoma and never return. In Ex Parte Snyder, 159
P.2d 752 (Okla. 1945), a similar condition was approved. The court noted:
"* * *In the instant case, there was no
involuntary transportation of the petitioner
out of the State. The parole, with all of the
conditions set forth therein, was a matter
which the petitioner could accept or reject.
He gave his written acceptance and, pursuant
to its terms, voluntarily left the State.
16
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In 39 Am. Jur. 576, Section 89, it is stated:
'It is a well-established rule that a parole
must be accepted by the convict before it
becomes effective to secure to him his liberty;
that is, it is for him to elect whether he will
accept the parole with its conditions or reject
it and remain in prison.'
The authorities from other jurisdictions
seem to hold that a condition inserted in a
pardon or parole that the convict shall leave
the state and never return is good. * * *"
It seems clear that the judicial authorities that
have considered the issue here presented have unanimously affir.med conditions the same as or similar
to those imposed in the instant case. An analysis
of their reasoning, and the reasoning favoring
such action supports such use.
First, historically there has been no objection
to the use of exclusionary conditional releases or
pardons. Consequently, they could not have been
considered to be contrary to state or federal constitutional provisions. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4
Dall) 14 (1800); State v. FUller, 1 McCord, 178, 12
S.C. Law 178 (1812); United States v. Wilson, 32
U.S. (7 Pet) 149 (1833).
Secondly, such conditions have not been deemed
cruel or unusual, People v. Rotter, 1 Edm. Sel Cas.
235 (N.Y. 1846). Cases subsequent to the Fourteenth
Amendment have also so held. See especially Legarda
v. Valdez, 1 Phili'ppine 146 ( 1902), rejecting the con17
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cept that such activity is cruel or unusual, See
also State v. W~Odward, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S.E. 385
(1910); Ex Parte Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49 P.2d
438. Indeed, it is difficult to see how such a conditoin could be deemed a punishment. The normal
penal restraints are lifted and the prisoner set free.
As far as restrictions on his liberty are concerned,
he is in an improved position. Secondly, the purposes of such action are manyfold, and not connected with punishment. A pardon authority may
be motivated by limited custodial or parole staff;
a belief that removal from the criminal environment which resulted in confinement would be appropriate, Ex Parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 33 S.W.
106 (189'5); a feeling that the community is thereby
better protected; simple incapacitation and a recognition that such remedial exclusion may motivate changes away from criminal habits. All of these
are factors which are .more likely to motivate a
pardons authority than retribution.6
Third, it is generally recognized that if the
restriction on an individual's liberty has some reasonable relationship to a proper governmental pursuit, then it is proper. The State in the instant
case is exercising a reasonable function of its police power. Appellant has cited in his brief cases
which indicate that there is a right of a citizen
5

;

5

6

Sterilization is nothing more. 64-10-1, U.C.A. 1953; Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535.
Cf. 111 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 758 (1963). The assumption that
retribution is the motive is hardly supportable.

18
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to travel uninhibited by State restrictions. However, these cases are not applicable to the instant
situation. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941), the California anti-migrant statute was
held unconstitutional, but only because of a violation of the commerce clause. If appellant's argument were valid, that he has an absolute right
to travel, pardon or parole restrictions prohibiting a prisoner from leaving a state, or going into
certain areas, i.e., bars, brothels, casinos, would
also be illegal. The case of Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall) 35 (1868), striking down Nevada's
tax on persons leaving the state, is equally inapplicable. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S ..270 (1900).
Courts have consistently recognized the right,
pursuant to the police power of a state to impose
reasonable restrictions on travel or activity. In Ex
Parte Brown, 243 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951)
a conditional release upon condition that a person
enter the Armed Services was upheld, even though
such condition would obviously inhibit a convict's
liberty of travel or action. In Huff v. Aldredge,
192 Ga. 12, 14 S.E.2d 456 (1941), a condition that
the individual join the C.C.C. was allowed as proper. If as this court noted in the case of McCoy v.
Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945),
parole conditions do not change the fact that a
convict is still a prisoner, it is equally true that a
conditional release does not change a prisoner's status. Since restrictions on liberty and movement are
19

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

inherent in and indigenous to a prisoner-sovereign
relationship, a restriction conditioned as the instant
one was, is proper. Indeed, Congress has itself passed many laws restricting the right of travel, i.e.
fugiti've felon law, passports laws. In exercise of
the war power, the Supreme Court of the United
States has upheld detention and relocation of segments of the citizenry. Korgmatsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayasbi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943). In 111 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev.
758, 774 (1963), the author notes the limitations
on the right to travel argument:
"This argument, however, may go too
far. Of chief concern is the possible effect
of such a doctrine on useful restrictions
analogous to parole. For instance, the administration of the Interstate Compact might be
affected. Any program limiting the right to
tra:vel would seem to be jeopardized regardless of pen\o1ogical considerations. If an
attempt were made to protect the parole
system on the ground that the right to travel
is no more applicable to a parolee than to an
imprisoned convict, the same reasoning could
be applied to a banished convict.* * *"
If there is a reasonable relationship between
the powers properly exercised by the sO'vereign and
any restrictions on individual liberty, i.e. travel,
etc., the restrictions are proper. In Shacbtman v.
Dulles, 225 F ..2d 938 (1955), the court noted in a
passport application case:
"The right to travel, to go from place
20
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to place as the means of transportation permit
is a natural right subject to the rights of
others and to reasonable regulation under
law." (Emphasis added.)
See also Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C.
Cir. 1959) and Porter v. Herter, 278 F.2d 280 (D.C.
Cr. 1960), upholding executive restrictions incident
to the power to control foreign relations and compare it with the reasoning in Ex Parte Hawkins,
61 Ark. 321, 33 S.W. 106 (1895), upholding the same
power incident to executive police power. Conditional pardon has a reasonable basis, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, see Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480
(1927), environmental change, and community protection, all historically recognized, and logically
proper.
With the obvious legal suppore as well as practical application by the Board of Pardons, it is difficult to see on what basis it could now be claimed
that the conditional procedure imposed here would
violate constitutional guarantees.
In the instant case where the petitioner had
been in difficulty in Utah, where his immedtate
environment on release was such that he would
be in trouble, and where parole supervision in his
home state was impossible, it is not unreasonable
for the Board to have pursued the remedy they did.
In the absence of a contrary showing, it must be
7

In addition to case law the Utah Attorney General ruled that
such action of the Board of Pardons was proper. Ops. Utah
Att'y Gen. 56-131 (1956).
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presumed they acted reasonably. The appellant
could have rejected the condition, and although the
bargaining position of appellant was not equal with
that of the Board of Pardons, inequality of bargaining position occurs daily, but is no grounds to avoid
a contract, absent fraud or duress, which is not
present here. Ex Parte Snyde,r, 159 P.2d 752 (Okla.
1945).
Finally, appellant relies upon a recent United
States Supreme Court case, Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, Oct. Term, 1962, Nos ..2 & 3, where the
Supreme Court struck down the forfeiture of citizenship where an individual left the country to
avoid military service. The court did not hold that
expatriation wasn't a proper sanction in an appropriate case, quite to the contrary, Sec. 401 (j)
of the Nationality Act of 1940 was declared unconstitutional because the procedural requirements
leading up to expatriation did not satisfy procedural
due process of law. The court stated:
"We hold § § 401(j) and 349(a) (10) invalid because in them Congress has plainly
employed the sanction of deprivation of nationality as a punishment-for the offense of
leaving or remaining outside the country to
evade military service-without affording the
procedural safeguards guaranteed by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.***"
It further implied that once procedural safeguards
were met, expatriation would be proper, p. 39:
"* **Our conclusion from the legislative
22
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and judicial history is, therefore, that Congress in these sections decreed an additional
punishment for the crime of draft avoidance
in the special category of cases wherein the
evader leaves the country. It cannot do this
without providing the safeguards which must
attend a criminal prosecution."
The Supreme Court has pre'viously recognized
that expatriation may be a proper remedy, where
a person votes in a foreign election, Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), and implied it to be a proper
sanction for voluntarily enlisting in a foreign military force. Nishikawu v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958) .
.Expatriation, if punishment, may be excessive in
some instances, Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958);
however, the conditional release is not punishment,
but control, and if reasonable under the circumstances, is clearly not cruel or unusual punishm·ent.
Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Philippine 146 (1902).
The instant case involves no claim of expatriation. Citizenship still is afforded appellant, he has
not been deprived of all civil rights; only a limitation attendant to his past conduct and directed
towards possible future conduct is imposed against
him.
It must be concluded that there is no basis to
appellant's claim that his constitutional rights have
been infringed, or that the Board of Pardons imposed unconstitutional conditions upon him.
23
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POINT II.
EVEN IF APPELLANT'S CONDITIONAL RELEASE
WAS IMPROPER, HE MAY NOT OBT'AIN RELEASE BY
HABEAS CORPUS.

The trial court ruled that even if the appellant's
conditional release, upon condition that he leave
the state, were illegal, the order of the Board
of Pardons would be null and void in total, and
he would, therefore, still be legally held under his original commitment. It is submitted the
trial court ruled correctly.
Whether an unconstitutional exception or condition in a statute voids the whole statute depends
upon whether it is such a 1naterial provision of
that statute that it is inseparable from the essential content of the statute, such that, but for such
exception or condition, the Legislature would not
have passed the act. Smith v. Carbon County, 95
Utah 340, 81 P.2d 370 (1938}; Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 2403. It is submitted a similar
construction should be applied in determining the
conditions applied to parole or termination by the
Board of Pardons. Instruments of pardon are subject to rules of construction applied to instruments
and contracts in general, 67 C.J.S., Pardons, Sec.
11. It is a general rule of contract law that if a
condition in a contract is void, and if that condition is essential to the 'very heart of the contract
and inseparable therefrom, that the whole contract
is void. It is submitted that applying the above rules
24
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of construction to the order of the Board of Pardons
in this case, that if the condition of release is void,
the whole order is void. It is obvious that where
the Board of Pardons refused a more controlled
parole and offered the appellant conditional release
or nothing, that if the Board had felt the condition void, it would not have released the appellant.
Consequently, habeas corpus will not lie to release
the appellant since the order of the Board of Pardons, if the condition of release is void, is itself void
and appellant is still imprisoned on his original
commitment.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's contentions, when examined in the
light of previous judicial declarations, and the obvious motivations of the Board of Pardons, provide
no basis for a claim that the Board of Pardons
exceeded the limits of its constitutional powers. Even
so, appellant would ha:ve no basis for relief by
habeas corpus.
It is submitted the judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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